NO VOTER FRAUD HERE: THE TRANSPARENT ELECTION PROCESS



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SUMMARY

A bedrock of our democracy is the right to vote. Protecting the right to vote, preventing election fraud, ensuring ballot process integrity and reviewing past elections for ways to improve voting processes are crucial parts of the Orange County Registrar of Voters (ROV) activities. The Grand Jury observed ROV operations in the 2016 General Election, including Orange County's pilot implementation of the state's new election law, California Senate Bill 450 (SB450). The passage of SB450 in August 2016 provided an opportunity for Orange County to conduct early evaluation of a new voting model with the potential to increase voter participation and improve convenience and accessibility through the use of Voting Service Centers.

Preparing ballots, staffing voting sites and tallying ballots used to be a behind-the-scenes operation, but with past contested elections and a wave of current negative rhetoric, ROV actions have taken center stage, requiring a new level of transparency that was observed by the Grand Jury. The ease with which technical electronic devices can be manipulated has become a topic of public conversation. Protection against intrusion of electronic registration and voting machines presents new challenges to ensure vote integrity.

The Grand Jury was impressed with the commitment of all employees, volunteers and poll workers to maintain ballot box security and vote integrity, over and above Federal and State laws. The Grand Jury found no evidence of widespread or organized voter fraud or vote interference in Orange County election processes in this year's General Election. (See Appendix A for descriptions and types of potential voter fraud.)

COMMENDATION

The ROV along with paid employees, volunteers, and temporary help who staff the offices and provide poll support should be commended for their skills and dedication to ensure that those who are eligible to vote are given every opportunity to register and lawfully exercise their right to vote with ease. By taking a proactive position, looking for ways to improve the process, and ensuring the integrity of the voting process, the ROV promotes public confidence in the election process.

REASON FOR REPORT

Historically, Orange County Grand Juries empaneled during election years have reported on the processes and operations of the ROV. During the past twelve years, the Grand Jury has released five comprehensive reports on the election processes in Orange County. Given the unprecedented media coverage of this year's General Election, the preceding and ensuing rhetoric and accusations about the integrity of the ballot, the unique tensions surrounding this year's presidential candidates, and the many controversial local issues facing Orange County, the 2016-2017 Grand Jury sought to thoroughly examine the ROV's operations.

The Grand Jury was also interested in observing Orange County's early implementation of the new voting model that will come on-line for some counties in the state with the 2018 mid-term

elections as a result of SB450 passed in 2016. It is believed that Voting Service Centers, as detailed in SB450 (California Government, 2016), which are to be located at strategic sites throughout the County, will promote voter turnout, provide longer timeframes for ballot casting, maintain the security of the voting process, and preserve election integrity in the years ahead.

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

To ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the voting process in Orange County, the Grand Jury examined all areas of election operations and management, including voter registration, control and use of the voter registration roster, ballot creation and production, ballot integrity and security, electronic voting systems performance, provisional ballot handling, use of pre- and post-election automation, vote-by-mail controls, handling of out-of-county voters, and voting service centers operations. The Grand Jury obtained and reviewed articles from print media, electronic media, e-mails, and alerts provided by the ROV through their web site, and each member was given a poll worker handbook.

The Grand Jury interviewed ROV administrative personnel and employees, heard a presentation from the ROV on historical voting habits in Orange County, and attended the three and one-half hour training course given to all poll workers. Members of the Grand Jury observed Logic and Accuracy Testing and, prior to Election Day, teams of Grand Jurors conducted site surveys of three pilot Voting Service Centers. On Election Day, the Grand Jury conducted polling site surveys and observed 39 polling sites representing 57 precincts in 15 cities in Orange County.

Grand Jury members also observed the start of the vote tally process the evening of November 8, the 1% audit manual count of the Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail ballot, a parallel printout of the electronic e-slate ballot on November 18, and attended the ROV post-election debriefing session in January.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

In the State of California, voting is regulated by Federal voting laws (USA.gov, n.d.) and the California Election Code (California Government, n.d.). The counties have implementation discretion within these regulations to provide voting services to their populations. The ROV reports to the Secretary of State and the Orange County Board of Supervisors.

As of November 2016, Orange County had 1,535,967 registered voters, a figure larger than the number of registered voters in many states. Since 2013, the ROV has taken a very proactive role in purging registration rolls of inactive voters, using several methods to cross check and authenticate voter identification. This corrective action of removing inactive voters from the rolls has led to increased voter turnout percentages at many precincts. In the 2016 General Election, 81% of registered voters in Orange County cast a vote; 58% of these voted by mail (VBM). (See graphs in Appendix D.) This shift toward VBM ballots has changed how elections are approached and how elections will be conducted in the future.

There are many elements to ensuring a legally compliant and successful election. The Grand Jury inquired into all of these elements; those areas of particular interest are listed below.

Pre-Election Day

Poll Worker Training

The ROV conducts a three-and-a half hour training session for all poll workers. The poll worker is the face of the ROV on Election Day, and ensures proper processes and voter rights are protected (California Secretary of State, 2016). The ROV training is comprehensive and includes: duties of poll workers, polling place setup, poll opening and first voter duties, checking the registered voter identification, electronic and paper ballot security, provisional ballot handling, and poll closing.

The process of registered voter identification is quite extensive and leaves little room for non-registered individuals to cast ballots in any Orange County election. Poll workers are trained to cross reference the residency of the person requesting to vote against the official roster of registered voters for that precinct. If residency cannot be verified, a provisional ballot is provided, and the verification process to determine voter eligibility is conducted later at the Registrar's office. Persons using a provisional ballot are provided with a numbered receipt so that they can check the status of their ballot. This receipt allows the voter to check online to confirm his vote has been counted. A provisional ballot allows the person to vote, but the validity of the vote is determined away from the polling site, where ample time and resources are available to make the final determination. In the rare case that attempted fraud is detected, the ROV refers the case to the District Attorney. Attempts at voter fraud are so minimal that election results are not impacted and the Grand Jury is confident that election results in Orange County are valid.

Concerns over potential voter fraud or "hacking" of County electronic voting systems are unfounded, as the electronic voting machines, called e-slates, generate a parallel paper ballot providing a hard copy of the electronic vote that is used later to validate the electronic vote tally during the 1% audit. E-slates are stand-alone equipment, referred to as "dumb" terminals, because they are not connected to the internet. Rather, all e-slates are connected to a Judge's Booth Controller (JBC), which provides the power to e-slates, as well as capturing all the information from the ballot cast by each voter. Additionally, e-slates have tamper-proof seals that are checked periodically during poll operations to ensure the integrity of the equipment. Poll workers are trained in the set-up and take-down of these machines.

Logic and Accuracy Testing

One week prior to Election Day a Logic and Accuracy test is performed at the ROV headquarters. This test, which is required by law, verifies that all combinations of the vote options for that election can be cast accurately. This testing is performed prior to each election. During the three-day process, over 500 combinations of vote options from across Orange County were tested. All 1,600 precincts and 1,093 polling sites across the County were represented in this year's test. ROV records show that in all elections since 2002, tests of the voting system

have been 100% accurate. These tests include proofing the programming of the ballot, each ballot style, and each contest position on the ballot. A statistical selection algorithm is designed to ensure that every vote option is cast at least once during the test. Before the process begins, a "zero tape" and "first voter check" are conducted to ensure no stored votes are on the system before testing commenced. The results of these tests are sent to the State for validation.

Pilot Voting Service Center Observations

Voting Service Centers are mandated by SB450 to replace the old precinct model. Orange County was the only California county to pilot test these centers in the 2016 General Election. Operating for ten days from October 29th through November 7th, 2016, the Voting Service Centers at six locations provided early electronic and paper ballot voting, drop off sites for VBM ballots, and sites where those registered to vote in Orange County could cast a ballot that was specific to their precinct, regardless of their place of residence or where the Voting Service Center was located. The use of the Voting Service Centers accounted for 27,554 early electronic ballots, 1.8% of the total votes cast.

Documented site surveys were conducted by Grand Jury members at the following three Voting Center sites:

1. <u>Mission Viejo City Hall</u> 200 Civic Center, Mission Viejo, CA 92691 (this site also provided drive through VBM ballot drop-off)

Surveyed on November 3, 2016, the Grand Jury team observed clear identification of the polling site and entrance location. Members were greeted and good customer relations were noted. A Coordinator from the ROV was on site helping poll workers. This site had 22 e-slates, and at the time of the survey voters were proceeding smoothly through the official table and the voting process, with an average voting time of less than 8 minutes. This site processed 852 voters on November 5th, 894 on the 6th, and 749 on the 7th for a total of almost 2,500 early voters in this three day period. Per procedures, a series of questions were asked of those requesting to vote. Inquiries by panel members about the JBC Chain of Custody prompted minor corrective action by poll workers. Bilingual voter assistance was available.

2. <u>Orange County ROV Office</u> 1300 S. Grand Avenue, Building C, Santa Ana, CA 92705 (this site also provided drive through VBM ballot drop-off)

Surveyed on November 4th, 2016, the following observations were made: The site had easy access, poll workers were clearly identified and the drive through VBM ballot drop-off site had a secure container for ballots. Replacement ballots were printed upon demand. Six additional eslate voting tablets were added the day before due to long wait times for voters, bringing the total number of e-slates to 11. All elements of validation of voter eligibility and timely processing were addressed. Voter assistance included Spanish and Vietnamese language poll workers. Accommodations were provided for voters with disabilities, and personal assistance was available if requested. Almost 8,700 early voters were processed at the ROV while serving as a Voting Service Center.

3. Anaheim Civic Center 200 S. Anaheim Boulevard #217, Anaheim, CA 92805

Surveyed on November 7th, this Voting Service Center, located in the same building as Anaheim City Hall, was extremely crowded with a line of voters waiting almost one hour to proceed to the official table to sign in. The room contained 20 e-slates and five voting booths for paper ballots. Two City of Anaheim employees provided additional assistance, directing voters in support of five ROV employees. Accommodations were in place for voters with disabilities. This location processed 548 ballots on the November 5th, 603 on the 6th, and 741 on the 7th. Ballots were properly secured and the voter eligibility process followed proper procedure. One voter was directed to proceed to the county in which he was registered. There is no agreement between counties to forward provisional ballots across county lines. One comment from a voter and a survey observation was that the illumination in the room was poor. Also, one poll worker did not have proper identification in the form of a badge created by the ROV for poll workers, simply because it had broken during the day.

The Voting Service Centers were observed as part of the total 2016 Election operations and provided the Grand Jury with information about how the new voting model may be implemented in the 2018 mid-term election. (See Appendix B.)

Election Day

Polling Place Observations

To effect uniform observations of all polling sites, the Grand Jury developed a comprehensive checklist with input from the ROV, establishing seven areas of focus. This checklist was used by Grand Jury members for their Election Day observations. (See Appendix C.) On Election Day, the Grand Jury conducted polling site surveys of 39 polling sites representing 57 precincts and 15 cities. The areas evaluated were the following:

- Polling Site Early Set-up
- Polling Site Opening & First Voter
- Validation of Voter Eligibility & Timely Processing
- Voter Assistance and Clarification of Questions
- Ballot Security
- Handling of Provisional and Paper Ballots
- Polling Site Close and Initial Talley

Polling sites were observed before they opened to voting to evaluate polling place set-up and readiness. While a few minor kinks were observed in opening day setup, virtually all polling sites were well prepared and had the required signage for disabled voters, signage at the main entrance point, and updated copies of the street index displayed outside the polling site.

Observers tracked polling site management, voter processing time, validation of voter identification, and voter assistance. Voting times varied throughout the day from eight minutes to as long as 80 minutes during the peak voting times from 5:00 p.m. until poll closing at 8:00 p.m. Inspectors of Elections were, on the whole, professional and adequately handled voters'

questions. Language assistance was observed at several sites, matching the voting population in the precinct. Poll workers were observed wearing badges indicating they spoke other languages. Outside observers were noted at one polling site, but there were no indications of voter intimidation or electioneering. Spoiled ballots were marked with large X's on both sides. VBM ballots were properly validated and dropped off. Security seals on e-slates and the JBCs were checked on schedule by an Inspector of Elections as required by procedure, with a few polling sites prompted by Grand Jury queries to sign the Chain of Custody document that notes inspections at designated times.

Polling site closures were smooth, with voters in-line at the polling place at 8:00 p.m. allowed to complete voting. Once the polling sites were clear of the last voter, the ballot box was unsealed and ballots were organized and secured. Ballot and JBC security was maintained during this process.

Provisional Ballot/Paper Ballot Observations

Polling sites located in neighborhoods with large apartment complexes nearby processed large numbers of provisional ballots due to the transitory nature of the residents. Voter rosters and street indexes were checked before providing a provisional ballot, as required by procedure. Provisional access codes and completed provisional ballots were handled correctly, and a receipt was provided to provisional voters as required.

Vote Tally Processing

Polling site materials began arriving at the ROV offices shortly after 9:00 p.m. Election process required that JBCs be driven from polling sites to a collection point, with the JBC in the Inspector's vehicle, while another poll worker followed in their personal vehicle. Once at the collection point, the JBCs were under the protection of the Orange County Sheriff, who accompanied vans loaded with JBCs to the ROV offices for electronic vote tally. Public observers wishing to witness the tally process signed in and passed through a security check point. Sheriff's officers stood guard as JBCs were unloaded onto a conveyer, opened in a secure space and one designated person removed the chip with the electronic vote information. Chips were consolidated, placed in a small cylinder, and sent via a vacuum line to the secure tabulation room where they were plugged into a computer and the contents downloaded. The process was available for the public to view in real time through the Registrar's web site.

Post-Election Day

1% Audit of Paper and Electronic Ballots

Cross checks of a representative selection of the paper tape print-outs of electronic ballots against the actual electronic ballots are used to confirm the ballot count and represent the exact tabulation of all voters' selections. These audits consist of worker teams reading paper and electronic ballots from a statistically selected 1% of Orange County precincts and tabulating the data into pre-printed tally sheets. The Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail ballot is a parallel

printout of the electronic e-slate ballot. Once the hand tally is completed, the final number is compared to the electronic tally.

This process was mandated 51 years ago and is required by California Elections Code, Section 15360 (California Government, n.d.). This year the 1% sample covered 77 precincts and required 70 people working 12 hour days, representing over 6,000 man-hours.

Election Debrief January 2017

After the certification of election results to the California Secretary of State, the ROV takes a very proactive position in reviewing every process, with an eye on improving the next election. Representatives of all units within the Registrar's office participated in this debriefing with the goal of incorporating observations into action items. The review covered all aspects of the voting process from candidate filing, voting by mail, and ballot quality control, to polling place recruitment, the new pilot vote centers, and election night operations.

Given the diversity of voters in Orange County and the language groups represented, a crucial aspect of ballot preparation is the translation of candidate statements and ballot measures into clear and concise Spanish, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Korean. This is required by Section 203 of the Federal Voting Rights Act. Section 14201 of the California Elections Code requires that a facsimile ballot shall be posted in other languages as determined by the Secretary of State. The preparation of ballots in the various language groups was discussed at length during the debriefing.

The January 2017 debriefing of the 2016 General Election included a forum where issues of staffing and access to the pilot Voting Service Centers were raised. For this election, the Orange County ROV made every effort to mimic the legislation of SB450, as Orange County was the only county in the state to test Voting Service Centers. An item discussed during the debriefing was facilitating implementation, since these voting centers need to have large rooms with easy access that can be open for a ten day period for 28 sites, as well as four days for an additional 140 sites. (See Appendix B.) Election codes require sites be Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant, support technical needs, and provide space and consistency for the voting period. Staffing will also change for elections using Voting Service Centers, from 7,500 volunteers for the 2016 General Election to a smaller pool of short-term employees needed to manage voter turnout, which is expected to range from 10,000 to 50,000 per site. Issues of logistics for supplies and Chain of Custody for ballots and electronic equipment were also discussed.

The Future of Voting

In July 2015, the State of California began a roll-out of a single, uniform centralized voter registration database called the VoteCal Project. Beginning with Orange and Sacramento Counties, this process was completed in March 2016 to bring the State into compliance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002. Orange County was one of the first counties involved in the implementation of this new system and quickly uncovered 460 voters who had duplicate registration records in Orange and Sacramento counties (Myers, 2016). The ROV, in the normal

course of business, is constantly updating registration records. This process takes time, but there are other checks already in place to ensure voters do not vote more than once, such as address verification on Election Day.

With its completion, this new system connects all 58 county Election Management Systems with each other, as well as with other state agencies that provide information on the 19.4 million registered voters in the state. By connecting to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, persons with felonies are removed from registration rolls. Data from the California Department of Public Health provides a timely way to remove voters who are deceased, as well as block those seeking to register under the name of a deceased person. The California Employment Development Department and the California Department of Motor Vehicles update addresses and provide a way to update voter registrations (California Secretary of State, 2016).

The ROV interfaces with the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Prior to the election ROV received flash reports and kept in close contact with the FBI and DHS as part of DHS's Cybersecurity Team. Testing of the ROV data system was conducted by a vendor prior to the election.

Electronic Voter Registration data bases in Arizona and Illinois were hacked in July 2016, compromising personal voter records but not threatening the election process (Tribune News Services, 2016). To protect voter registration data, the Orange County ROV maintains their own parallel data base for Orange County's registered voters, which is updated daily. Should the State system go down or be impacted by outside agencies, the parallel system in Orange County is protected with independent servers under the ROV's control that are not connected externally. This redundant system provides security of the voter registration database.

With passage of SB450 in August 2016, all registered voters in the state will receive a VBM ballot and local precincts will be eliminated, replaced by "voter service centers" located close to where people work, shop, or congregate. This model will also provide a ten day window for voters to either drop off their VBM ballots, or go to a vote center and cast an electronic ballot. With the new statewide registered voter database, a person living in Yorba Linda can go to a voting center in San Clemente, prove that they are a registered voter in Orange County and be provided with a ballot that includes elected offices and issues that are specific to the community and precinct where they live in the language they prefer. This model has been used in Colorado since 2014, with a significant increase in voter turnout. Since voter turnout in California ranked 43rd among the 50 states and the District of Columbia in 2014, these two new voting tools could have an impact on increasing voter turnout (Senate District 26, 2017).

The six Orange County Voting Service Centers used during the 2016 General Election could be considered a beta test for the new voting system. SB450 permits 14 counties to opt in to the new system beginning in 2018, with Orange County one of the first to implement this new process. The key elements of SB450 and the impact on voters in Orange County are:

• Every eligible voter will receive a mailed ballot 29 days before Election Day.

- The in-person voting option is available for 10 days.
- 28 vote centers will be open for 10 days (1 for every 50,000 Registered Voters).
- 140 vote centers will be open for 4 days (1 for every 10,000 Registered Voters).
- 93 secure drop off locations in the County (1 for every 15,000 Registered Voters).
- Orange County is listed in the bill as having an option in 2018 to use Voting Service Centers.

Pilot Voting Service Centers located in Anaheim, Costa Mesa, Irvine, Mission Viejo, Westminster, and the ROV offices in Santa Ana provided a new way for registered voters in Orange County to cast a ballot during the General Election of 2016. With the passage of SB450, these Voting Service Centers are models of what voting will look like in the near future for some California counties.

Prior to the first full countywide implementation of Voting Service Centers, the ROV will begin a massive outreach program to Orange County residents clearly explaining how this new voting process will function. While the state requires at least two informational mailings on the new process, the ROV is planning on as many as ten to ensure that information is widely disseminated and understood. With approximately 60% of votes cast in Orange County by mail, using Voting Service Centers represents a significant behavior change for many Orange County residents.

One way the ROV hopes to face these challenges and promote change is through their outreach program, clearly defining the numerous advantages that Voting Service Centers provide. These include:

- Polling will be more convenient and open for a longer period of time.
- Reducing the number of polling places lowers the cost of elections and increases efficiency.
- Adding additional ballot drop off locations makes it easier for voters,
- Voting Service Centers will be staffed by paid employees, not volunteer poll workers, providing more control of each polling site and improving efficiency.
- The number of provisional ballots will be reduced, and almost eliminated, with the only exception being those who register the same day as they vote.
- Larger voting sites will make it easier to provide easy access and ensure compliance with ADA standards.
- Increasing voter turnout.

CONCLUSION

The Grand Jury found that the Orange County ROV operations assure that the right to vote is protected for county citizens, with effective mechanisms in place to prevent fraud. Allegations of voter fraud, vote rigging and illegal voters casting ballots have been found to be without merit in Orange County. The ROV continues to take a very proactive approach to improving the voting process for the citizens of Orange County. Training, implementation and follow-up are all in compliance with California Election Code and are attended to diligently. By being the first county in the State of California to use the new tools provided by SB450, the ROV has used the

2016 General Election as a test case for the use of Voting Service Centers and these centers will likely be the future of voting in Orange County.

FINDINGS

In accordance with *California Penal Code* Sections §933 and§ 933.05, the 2016-2017 Grand Jury requires (or, as noted, requests) responses from each agency affected by the findings presented in this section. The responses are to be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Based on the investigation titled, "No voter fraud here: The transparent election process", the 2016-2017 Grand Jury has arrived at six principal findings as follows:

- F.1. There is no evidence of widespread or organized voter fraud or voter interference in Orange County.
- F.2. The Grand Jury has confidence in the integrity of the ballot process and the accuracy of election results.
- F.3. The ROV office has reviewed and updated voter registration rolls per State and Federal guidelines improving voter turnout percentages.
- F. 4. The Grand Jury viewed pilots of Voter Service Centers for the 2016 General Election and found they increased accessibility and operated in accordance with Federal and State voting requirements.
- F.5. The ROV communications and outreach programs promote transparency and encourage outside observations by the voting public.
- F.6. The management skills demonstrated by ROV staff and volunteers were effective and will support moving the voting process into the new voting model under SB450.

Penal Code §933 and §933.05 require governing bodies and elected officials to which a report is directed to respond to findings and recommendations. Responses are requested from departments of local agencies and their non-elected department heads.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In accordance with *California Penal Code* §933 and §933.05, the 2016-2017 Grand Jury requires (or, as noted, requests) responses from each agency affected by the recommendations presented in this section. The responses are to be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Based on its investigation titled, "No voter fraud here: The transparent election process", the 2016-2017 Orange County Grand Jury has **no** recommendations.

REQUIRED RESPONSES

The *California Penal Code* §933 requires the governing body of any public agency which the Grand Jury has reviewed, and about which it has issued a final report, to comment to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations pertaining to matters under the control of the governing body. Such comment shall be made no later than 90 days after the Grand Jury publishes its report (filed with the Clerk of the Court). Additionally, in the case of a report containing findings and recommendations pertaining to a department or agency headed by an elected County official (e.g. District Attorney, Sheriff, etc.), such elected County official shall comment on the findings and recommendations pertaining to the matters under that elected official's control within 60 days to the Presiding Judge with an information copy sent to the Board of Supervisors.

Furthermore, California Penal Code Section §933.05 (a), (b), (c), details, as follows, the manner in which such comment(s) are to be made:

- (a) As to each Grand Jury finding, the responding person or entity shall indicate one of the following:
- (1) The respondent agrees with the finding
- (2) The respondent disagrees wholly or partially with the finding, in which case the response shall specify the portion of the finding that is disputed and shall include an explanation of the reasons therefore.
- (b) As to each Grand Jury recommendation, the responding person or entity shall report one of the following actions:
- (1) The recommendation has been implemented, with a summary regarding the implemented action.
- (2) The recommendation has not yet been implemented, but will be implemented in the future, with a time frame for implementation.
- (3) The recommendation requires further analysis, with an explanation and the scope and parameters of an analysis or study, and a time frame for the matter to be prepared for discussion by the officer or head of the agency or department being investigated or reviewed, including the governing body of the public agency when applicable. This time frame shall not exceed six months from the date of publication of the Grand Jury report.
- (4) The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable, with an explanation therefore.
- (c) If a finding or recommendation of the Grand Jury addresses budgetary or personnel matters of a county agency or department headed by an elected officer, both the agency or department head and the Board of Supervisors shall respond if requested by the Grand Jury, but the response of the Board of Supervisors shall address only those budgetary /or personnel matters over which it has some decision making authority. The response of the elected agency or department head shall address all aspects of the findings or recommendations affecting his or her agency or department.

Comments to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in compliance with Penal Code section §933.05 are required from:

Responses Required:

Responses are required from the following governing bodies within 90 days of the date of the publication of this report:

Orange County Board of Supervisors (Findings F.1-F.6)

Responses Requested:

Responses are requested from the following non-elected agency or department heads:

ROV (Findings F.1-F.6)

REFERENCES

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APPENDIX A: TERMS, TYPES OF FRAUD

Voter impersonation is a type of voter fraud in which a person claims to be someone else when casting a vote.

Double voting (ballot stuffing): One individual casts more than one ballot in the same election.

Dead voters: The name of a deceased person remains on a state's official list of registered voters and a living person fraudulently casts a ballot in that name.

Felon voter fraud: The casting of a ballot by a convicted felon who is not eligible to vote as a result of being a felon.

Voter suppression: A variety of tactics aimed at lowering or suppressing the number of voters who might otherwise vote in a particular election.


Registration fraud: Filling out and submitting a voter registration card for a fictional person, or filling out a voter registration card with the name of a real person, but without that person's consent, and forging his or her signature on the card.

Voter impersonation: A person claims to be someone else when casting a vote.

Vote-buying: Agreements between voters and others to buy and sell votes, such as a candidate paying voters to vote for him or her.

Fraud by election officials: Manipulation of ballots by officials administering the election, such as tossing out ballots or casting ballots in voters' names.

APPENDIX B: PROPOSED VOTE SERVICE CENTER LOCATIONS



Benefits of Vote Center Concept

Voter convenience

Matches data trends and adapts to voter behavior
Alleviates Election Day lines
Eliminates provisional ballots cast
Significant cost savings over time
Reduces certification times
Preserves in-person voting option
Allows for voting in any vote center Countywide
Eliminates "volunteers" and uncontrolled environment
Increases security
Utilizes electronic poll books
Ability to replace damaged ballots

APPENDIX C: GRAND JURY CHECKLIST FOR POLLING PLACE OBSERVATIONS

Precinct Number:	Inspector of Elections:	
Polling Place Address:		Grand Jury Member Arrival Time:
City and Zip Code:		Grand Jury Member Departure Time:
Type of Facility:		# of Poll Workers on Site:
Number of Precincts At This	Polling Site:	

	POLLING SITE				
	$\mathbf{A} = \text{Complete} \mathbf{B} = \text{Issue Noted} \mathbf{C} = \text{Not Applicable}$				
1.	Polling Site Early Set Up – Before Nov. 8th	A	В	C	COMMENTS
	 A. Cardboard Voting Booths Set Up B. Inside Signs In Place C. E-Booth Tamper-Evident Security Seals in Place 				
	D. Set-Up and Daisy Chain Cables ConnectedE. VVPAT Power Cords and Power Strip Installed				
	F. Power Strip Not Connected to Wall OutletG. No JBC or Paper Ballots on SiteH. Polling Site Secured for the Evening				
2.	Polling Site Opening & First Voter				
	A. County Cell Phone Turned OnB. Oath/Payroll Page SignedC. E-Booth Security Seals Verified/Chain of Custody Signed				
	 D. E-Booths Set Up/# of Booths E. Cardboard Voting Booths Set Up F. Power Strip Connected and On G. Outside and Inside Signs in Place H. JBC Seals in Place/Chain of Custody Signed 				
	I. Gray Data Cable Attached to First BoothJ. Black Power Cord Connected to Power Strip/Outlet				
	 K. JBC Set-Up Complete L. Official Table Properly Set Up M. American Flag Outside by Entrance to Polling Site 				
	N. First Voter Verifies Ballot Box is Empty & Sealed				
	O. First Voter Verifies that PUB Count is ZeroP. First Voter Signs Zero Tape for JBCQ. Poll Worker Puts Signed Zero Tape in JBC Envelope				

3.	Validation of Voter Eligibility & Timely	
	Processing	
	A. Voter Name Verified, Voter Signs, Writes	
	Address	
	B. Street Address Confirmed	H H
	C. JBC Assignment Completed	H H
	D. Traffic Flow Through Polling Place Managed	
	E. Time From Arrival to Vote Complete <10	
	Minutes	
	F. Is Polling Site High Volume? Comment on	
	Process	
4.	Voter Assistance and Clarification of	
	Questions	
	A. Voters GreetedB. Poll Workers Have Proper Identification	H H
	C. Poll Workers Professional, Discreet,	H H H
	Courteous	
	D. E-Slate Instructions Provided as Needed	
	E. Spoiled Paper Ballots Identified and	
	Secured	
	F. Poll Workers are Proactive with Disabled	
	Voters	
	G. Language Assistance Provided Where	
	Needed H. Enguras No Digraptions Allowed in Polling	
	H. Ensures No Disruptions Allowed in Polling Site	
	I. Quick Transactions for Drop Off Ballots	
	J. Comment on Inspector of Elections Polling	
	Site Management	
5.	Ballot Security	
	A. Timely Verification of Tamper-Evident	
	Seals P. Bellet Bern Berneiter in Class Site and	
	B. Ballot Box Remains in Clear Site and Sealed	
	C. Clear Lines of Site from Table to	
	Booths/Entrance	
	D. "Marked" & "Table" Street Index Updated	
	Hourly	
	E. Issues of Electioneering/Intimidation	
	Addressed	
	F. E-Booth & JBC Security Seals	
	Verified/Chain of Custody Signed	

6.	Handling of Provisional and Paper Ballots	
	A. Voter Requesting to Vote Properly Processed	
	B. Provisional Ballot Envelop Completed	
	C. Provisional Access Code Handled	
	Correctly	
	D. Provisional Ballots Secured in Envelop/Ballot Box	
	E. Receipt Given to Voter for Ballot Status	
	Check	
7.	Polling Site Close and Initial Talley	
	A. Announcement of Polling Site Closing	
	B. Last Voter in Line Identified	
	C. Unused/Spoiled/Surrendered Ballots Counted	
	D. Ballot Box Unsealed/Ballots	
	Organized/Secured	
	E. All Items Packed	
	F. Site Cleaned	
Oth	er Observations/Comments:	
-		
-		
-		
		

APPENDIX D: SELECTED CALIFORNIA VOTER TURNOUT AND PERCENTAGES

Figure 1.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

